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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
No. 7:12-CV-2-D
MAURICE ROCHA,
Plaintiff,
v.
COASTAL CAROLINA 
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC CRISIS 
SERVICES, P.A.,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
) ORDER
)
)
)
)
)
)
On January 4,2012, Maurice Rocha (“Rocha”) filed this employment discrimination action 
against Coastal Carolina Neuropsychiatric Crisis Services, P.A. (“CCNCS”), Ash Mikhail 
(“Mikhail”), and Tobi Gilbert (“Gilbert”) (collectively “defendants”). See [D.E. 1]. In his 
complaint, Rocha (who is proceeding pro se) alleged that CCNCS, Mikhail, and Gilbert terminated 
his employment as a mental health worker with CCNCS in violation o f the Americans with 
Disabilities Act o f 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 701-796, and Title VH of the Civil Rights Act o f 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (“Tide 
VH”). On January 23, 2012, Rocha filed an amended complaint alleging that he was terminated 
because o f a disability and due to his national origin (“first amended complaint”) [D.E. 6]. On 
March 5,2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss and an answer to Rocha’s complaint and first 
amended complaint, admitting that CCNCS terminated Rocha’s employment, but denying unlawful 
employment discrimination [D.E. 20]. According to CCNCS, it terminated Rocha’s employment 
because he failed to disclose three felony cocaine possession convictions on his employment 
application.
On June 20,2012, the court allowed Rocha to amend his complaint for the second time. See 
[D.E. 31]. In his second amended complaint [D.E. 32], Rocha omits any reference to the 
Rehabilitation Act, thereby withdrawing any claim related to the Rehabilitation Act, but restates his 
disparate treatment claim under the ADA and his disparate impact claim under Title VII. 
Specifically, Rocha contends that (1) CCNCS regarded him as being a drug addict and terminated 
his employment in violation o f the ADA and (2) CCNCS has a policy o f not hiring people convicted 
o f crimes, which has a disparate impact on Hispanics in violation o f Title VII. On June 20,2012, 
the court held that defendants Mikhail and Gilbert could not be individually liable under the ADA 
or Title VII and dismissed them from the action. See [D.E. 31].
On June 27, 2013, CCNCS moved for summary judgment [D.E. 113] and filed a 
memorandum [D.E. 114] and evidence [D.E. 115] in support. Essentially, CCNCS contends that 
it never regarded Rocha as being disabled or being a drug addict and that it has never had a policy 
o f not hiring people convicted o f crimes. Rather, CCNCS contends that it terminated Rocha’s 
employment after concluding that Rocha made a material misrepresentation about his criminal 
history on his employment application. Rocha responded in opposition [D.E. 118, 119, 120] to 
CCNCS’s motion for summary judgment and filed his own cross-motion for summary judgment 
[D.E. 125]. Thereafter, the parties filed responses, replies, and numerous other motions. As 
explained below, the court grants CCNCS’s motion for summary judgment and denies all other 
motions.
I .
CCNCS operated an out-patient mental health treatment facility in Jacksonville, North 
Carolina where it treated patients with mental health disorders and drug addictions. [D.E. 115-1],
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Gilbert Aff. f  6 (“Gilbert Aff.”).1 CCNCS offered several mental health services in Jacksonville,
including a 23-hour observation service, a non-hospital based medical detox service, and a crisis
facility. Id. The medical detox service and crisis facility were both licensed pursuant to the Mental
Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Act o f 1985. See id. f  7: N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 122C-1-122C-433. CCNCS’s treatment o f patients often included the use o f controlled
substances, narcotics, and other medications. Gilbert Aff. 15-16.
On October 13, 2010, Rocha applied for employment with CCNCS as a mental health
worker. Id  I t  9-14. As part o f the application process, Rocha completed an employment
application. The employment application contained the following statement and question:
A RECORD OF CONVICTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY DISQUALIFY YOU 
FROM EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATION. Have you ever been CONVICTED
of a felony or misdemeanor, other than traffic violations? Y E S____ N O ____ .
If YES, list only convictions and dates: ______________________ .
[D.E. 115-1 ] 8. On his employment application, Rocha wrote that he had never been convicted of
a felony or misdemeanor. Id. The employment application also contained the following statement,
which Rocha signed, certifying that his employment application was true, correct, and complete:
IMPORTANT - READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING
I certify that the information provided in this Application for Employment is 
true, correct and complete. If employed, any misstatement or omission of 
material fact on this application will result in my immediate dismissal. I
authorize all persons, schools, companies, corporations, credit bureaus, government 
agencies, or any other party to release information concerning my background which 
may include, but is not limited to, criminal, credit, driver’s records, so long as not 
prohibited by law and the requests are job related.
Id. 9 (emphasis added).
As part o f the application process, Dr. Tobi Gilbert, CCNCS’s Clinical Director, interviewed
1 CCNCS ceased operations on March 30,2011. Gilbert Aff. f  32.
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Rocha. Seg Gilbert Aff. 1 10. Dr. Gilbert’s interview notes indicate that she “liked” Rocha. See 
[D.E. 115-3] 2. During the interview, Rocha never mentioned his felony convictions, never stated 
that he was a recovering drug addict, and never asked for any accommodation under the ADA. See 
[D.E. 115-7], Rocha Dep. 87-88,102-07 (“Rocha Dep.”). After the interview, CCNCS extended 
a conditional employment offer to Rocha on October 18, 2012. See Gilbert Aff. ffl 10-12. In 
accordance with its standard employment procedure, CCNCS conditioned Rocha’s employment offer 
upon Rocha submitting to a criminal background check. See id. Upon making the conditional offer 
o f employment to Rocha, CCNCS provided Rocha with a copy o f the CCNCS employee handbook 
(“CCNCS handbook”), which contained CCNCS’s employment policies. [D.E. 115-1], Ex. C; 
Gilbert Aff. 1 12. The CCNCS handbook states in relevant part:
Standards and Misconduct Issues
We have established standards and work rules which are designed to provide the
orderly and safe conduct o f employees while on the practice’s property___The list
o f unacceptable behavior below (which is not all-inclusive) represents the types 
which may subject an individual to disciplinary action up to and including 
termination.
• M isrepresentation in seeking employment.
• Dishonesty, stealing or removal o f another employee’s property. . . .
[D.E. 115-1] 26 (emphasis added). The CCNCS handbook also states that “[e]mployees are free to 
leave CCNCS’s service at any time and that any employee can be terminated at any time with or 
without notice and with or without stated cause [or] reason, except [as] prohibited by law.” [D.E. 
115-1] 15.
Rocha also received a copy o f CCNCS’s criminal records policy. See [D.E. 115-1], Ex. D; 
Gilbert Aff. f 12. The CCNCS criminal records policy protects “the safety o f people served by 
CCNCS, and the agency’s employees[] an d . . .  recognize[s] that people in recovery from substance
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abuse, who may be good candidates for employment, may have committed crimes while using 
substances. A careful review o f candidates’ criminal histories will take both [of] these factors into 
account.” Id. The CCNCS criminal records policy sets forth CCNCS’s procedure in conducting 
criminal background checks, and included the following statement: “[a]ll applicants are expected 
to reflect the information that will be disclosed on the criminal history report. Any deceit, 
intentional or unintentional, may disqualify a candidate from a position for which they are being 
considered.” Id. (emphasis added); Gilbert Aff. 13.2
On October 21, 2010, Rocha completed an authorization/release form. See [D.E. 115-6], 
Ex. F; [D.E. 115-7], Rocha Dep. 95. The authorization/release form authorized Adams Keegan (a 
national human resources company that managed human resources for CCNCS) to review Rocha’s 
background, including his criminal background, and permitted Adams Keegan to provide CCNCS 
an investigative consumer report concerning Rocha for employment purposes. See [D.E. 115-6], Ex. 
F; Gilbert Aff. 10-11. Rocha acknowledged in the authorization/release form that his criminal 
background would be checked. See [D.E. 115-6], Ex. F.
CCNCS conducted criminal history record checks o f all applicants applying for positions that 
did not require an occupational license. Gilbert Aff. Tf 11. Rocha’s duties as a mental health worker 
would place him in close proximity to patients to whom CCNCS dispensed controlled substances, 
and CCNCS had to keep a record o f its patients who took controlled substances. See id. 14-20. 
CCNCS conditioned Rocha’s offer o f employment upon CCNCS receiving satisfactory results 
following Adams Keegan’s comprehensive review o f Rocha’s background, including his criminal
2 Additionally, willfully furnishing false information on an employment application that is 
the basis for a criminal history record check to an entity such as CCNCS, which is licensed pursuant 
to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 122C-1 et seq.. is a misdemeanor in North Carolina. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
122C-80(f).
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history. Id. 10-12. Given that Rocha did not disclose any criminal history on his employment 
application, CCNCS expected to receive a background check reflecting no criminal history. See id. 
tlf 10-13,20-25.
Before CCNCS received and reviewed the results o f Rocha’s criminal history report from 
Adams Keegan, Rocha asked to meet with Dr. Gilbert. See Gilbert Aff. 1 27; [D.E. 115-7], Rocha 
Dep. 101-07,135-37. Before asking for the meeting, Rocha knew that he had failed to reveal any 
criminal convictions on his employment application. See Rocha Dep. 106. On October 22,2010, 
Dr. Gilbert met with Rocha. Rocha told Dr. Gilbert that when he was young he had a drug 
conviction, which he had failed to disclose on his employment application. See Gilbert Aff. 1 27; 
Rocha Dep. 101-07, 135-37.3 Moreover, during the meeting, Rocha did not disclose to Dr. Gilbert 
that he, in fact, had three felony convictions for possessing drugs, state that he was a former or 
current drug addict, or state that he had ever sought treatment for drug addiction. See Gilbert Aff. 
f  31; Rocha Dep. 36-37,101-07.
Based on the material discrepancy between Rocha’s employment application and Rocha’s 
criminal history, Dr. Gilbert concluded that Rocha made a material misstatement on his employment 
application, which subjected him to immediate dismissal. See Gilbert Aff. | |  14-30; see [D.E. 115­
9] 2-4. Accordingly, on October 22,2010, CCNCS terminated Rocha’s employment. See Gilbert 
Aff. f  30.
n.
The court reviews CCNCS’s motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal
3 In fact, in 1990 and 1991, Rocha was convicted in Florida o f three felonies related to 
possessing illegal drugs. See Rocha Dep. 30-36; [D.E. 115-9] 2-4. The criminal records concerning 
the convictions are in the name “Maurice Rourk.” See [D.E. 115-9] 2-4. Rocha changed his last 
name in 2005 from Rourk to Rocha. See Rocha Dep. 14.
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Rules o f Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record taken 
as a whole, no genuine issue o f material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter o f law. See, e ^ ,  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 
247-55 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. Ltd, v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 
(1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if  the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
see Anderson. 477 U.S. at 247—48. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of 
initially coming forward and demonstrating the absence o f a genuine issue o f material fact. Celotex 
Corp.. 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party then must 
affirmatively demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue o f material fact for trial. See Matsushita. 
475 U.S. at 587. “[Tjhere is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the 
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson. 477 U.S. at 249. 
Conjectural arguments will not suffice. See id. at 249-52; Beale v. Hardv. 769 F.2d 213,214 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (“The nonmoving p arty . . .  cannot create a genuine issue o f material fact through mere 
speculation or the building o f one inference upon another.”). Nor will a “mere . . . scintilla of 
evidence in support o f the [nonmoving party’s] position. . .  be []sufficient; there must be evidence 
on which the [fact finder] could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson. 477 U.S. 
at 252. In evaluating affidavits submitted in support o f or in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, the court may reject inadmissible evidence (such as hearsay) described in such affidavits. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.. 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 
1996). “When cross-motions for summary judgment are before a court, the court examines each 
motion separately, employing the familiar standard under Rule 56 o f the Federal Rules o f Civil
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Procedure.” Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming. T,T,C- 630 F.3d 351,354 (4th Cir. 2011).
A.
Rocha has no direct evidence o f illegal discrimination under the ADA; therefore, he relies 
on the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 
(1973). See Raytheon Co. V- Hernandez, 5401 IS . 44. 49 n 3 (7.003) To survive summary judgment 
on his ADA claim, Rocha must “produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that (1) he was a 
qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was discharged; (3) he was fulfilling his employer’s 
legitimate expectations at the time of discharge; and (4) the circumstances o f his discharge raise a 
reasonable inference o f unlawful discrimination.” Reynolds v. Am. N at’l Red Cross. 701 F.3d 143, 
150 (4th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted); Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC. 375 F.3d 266,272 
n.9 (4th Cir. 2004); Rhoads v. F.D.I.C.. 257 F.3d 373, 387 n . l l  (4th Cir. 2001); Haulbrook v. 
Michelin N. Am.. Inc.. 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001).4 CCNCS concedes that it terminated 
Rocha’s employment, but argues that Rocha has failed to raise a genuine issue o f material fact 
concerning the other three elements o f his prima facie case.
Rocha first must produce evidence that he was a “qualified individual with a disability” under 
the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §12112(a). The ADA defines ‘disability’ as “(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . ;  (B) a record o f such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” 
42 U.S.C. §12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). Section 12102(3), in turn, states:
For purposes o f paragraph (1)(C):
4 Although this order includes citations to cases applying the ADA before the ADA 
Amendment Act o f 2008 (“ADAAA”), the court has applied the AD AAA to Rocha’s ADA claim. 
See, e.e.. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1); Olsen v. Capital Region Med. Ctr.. 713 
F.3d 1149,1154 (8th Cir. 2013); Young v. United Parcel Serv.. Inc.. 707 F .3d437,443 n.7 (4th Cir. 
2013).
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(A) An individual meets the requirements o f “being regarded as having such 
an impairment” if  the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an 
action prohibited under this chapter because o f an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity.
(B) Paragraph 1(C) shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and 
minor. A transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration 
o f 6 months or less.
42U.S.C. § 12102(3). Under section 12102(3), which Congress added in the ADAAA, an individual 
bringing a “regarded as” claim need only show that an employer subjected him to an action that the 
ADA prohibits because o f an actual or perceived impairment regardless o f whether the employer 
perceived the impairment to limit the individual in am ajor life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3); 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1); Olsen. 713 F.3d at 1154; Gecewicz v. Henry Ford Macomb Hosp. Corp.. 
683 F.3d 316, 321-23 (6th Cir. 2012); Harris v. Reston Hosp. Ctr.. LLC. No. l:10-cv-1431, 2012 
WL 1080990, at *3-5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26,2012) (unpublished). Thus, a “regarded as” claim under 
the ADAAA is much easier to prove than a “regarded as” claim before the ADAAA. Cf, Young. 707 
F.3d at 443-44 (analyzing a pre-ADAAA “regarded as” claim); Rohan. 375 F.3d at 277-78 (same); 
Pollard v. High’s o f Baltimore. Inc.. 281 F.3d 462,471 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); Davis v. Univ. 
o f N.C.. 263 F.3d 95, 99-100 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Rhoads. 257 F.3d at 390-91 (same); 
Haulbrook. 252 F.3d at 703 (same).
Rocha testified that when CCNCS employed him from October 18 through October 22, he 
was not disabled and did not need a reasonable accommodation. See Rocha Dep. 87-89,127,138. 
Moreover, Rocha does not claim that he has a record o f impairment or that a physician has ever 
diagnosed him with an impairment, such as drug addiction. Id  89,91; c f  A Helping Hand. LLC v. 
Balt. Cntv.. 515 F.3d 356,367 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that drug addiction constitutes an impairment 
under the ADA, but that merely having an impairment does not make one disabled under the ADA).
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Rather, Rocha contends that CCNCS regarded him as having the impairment o f drug addiction and 
fired him because it mistakenly believed that he was a drug addict. In support, Rocha testified that 
he attended what he described as out-patient AA meetings for 18 months during 1991 and 1992. See 
Rocha Dep. 90-92. According to Rocha, he attended the meetings pursuant to a Florida court order 
arising from his felony drug convictions. Id. Rocha then argues that when he disclosed one o f his 
drug convictions to Dr. Gilbert during their meeting on October 22, 2010, Dr. Gilbert mistakenly 
regarded him as having an impairment, to wit, drug addiction, and fired him. As such, according to 
Rocha, he is a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA.
Rocha’s argument fails. Simply because Rocha told Dr. Gilbert on October 22,2010 that he 
had some problems with drugs when he was young and that his criminal background check would 
reveal a criminal conviction for drugs when he was young, see Rocha Dep. 102-07; Gilbert Aff. 
Tf 27, does not mean that CCNCS (via Dr. Gilbert or anyone else) regarded Rocha as being a drug 
addictin2010. There is no logical nexus between Rocha’s 1991 drug-possession conviction that he 
revealed to CCNCS in October 2010 and CCNCS regarding Rocha as having an impairment, to wit, 
drug addiction, in October 2010. See, e.g.. Pemice v. City o f Chicago. 237 F.3d 783,786-87 (7th 
Cir. 2001); Harris. 2012 WL 1080990, at *5-6. Notably, when Rocha revealed his 1991 drug- 
possession conviction to Dr. Gilbert, he said nothing about receiving treatment for drug addiction 
in 1991 or at any other time. See Rocha Dep. 87-92, 101-07. Thus, Rocha does not have a 
“disability” under the ADA, and there is no genuine issue o f material fact as to the first element of 
Rocha’s prima facie case. See Harris, 2012 WL 1080990, at *5-6.
Alternatively, Rocha has failed to create a genuine issue o f material fact about whether he 
was fillfilling CCNCS’s legitimate expectations when CCNCS terminated his employment. On 
October 22, 2010, Rocha told Dr. Gilbert that he had misrepresented his criminal history on his
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employment application. See Rocha Dep. 101-07; Gilbert Aff. |  27. Rocha volunteered this 
information to Dr. Gilbert after signing an authorization/release form for Adams Keegan to conduct 
a criminal background check and was aware that the background check would reveal his 
misrepresentation. See Rocha Dep. 95.106. CCNCS’s employment policy, which Rocha received, 
states that dishonesty or misrepresentations made while seeking employment would subject an 
employee to discipline, up to and including termination. See Gilbert Aff. 1 12. The employment 
application also stated that a misstatement o f a material fact would result in immediate dismissal. 
[D.E. 115-1 ] 9. By misstating a material fact on his employment application concerning his criminal 
history, Rocha failed to meet CCNCS’s legitimate expectations.
In opposition to this conclusion, Rocha argues that his 1990 and 1991 drug convictions are 
related to his history o f drug addiction. An employer, however, does not violate the ADA when it 
“discharges an individual based upon the employee’s misconduct, even if  the misconduct is related 
to a disability.” Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union. 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999); Pence v. 
Tenneco Auto. Operating Co.. 169 F. App’x 808,810-12 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished); 
see also Pemice. 237 F.3d at 785: Williams v. Widnall. 79 F.3d 1003,1007 (10th Cir. 1996); c f  42 
U.S.C. 12114(c)(4) (ADA allows an employer to “hold an employee who engages in the illegal use 
o f  drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job 
performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if  any unsatisfactory 
performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism o f such employee.”). Thus, even 
if  Rocha were able to prove that he is an individual with a disability, which he cannot, he is not 
excused from complying with CCNCS’s employment policies that require honest answers to 
questions about an employee’s criminal history. Indeed, and quite understandably, Rocha’s 
misrepresentation was especially troubling to CCNCS given his proximity to controlled substances
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at CCNCS, and CCNCS’s need to report whether the patients under Rocha’s care had taken their 
prescription drugs. See Gilbert Aff. | |  15-18, 21-22. Accordingly, Rocha was not meeting 
CCNCS’s legitimate expectations when CCNCS terminated his employment.
Alternatively, Rocha has failed to create a genuine issue o f material fact as to whether his 
employment termination raises a reasonable inference o f disability discrimination. Nothing in the 
record suggests that CCNCS terminated Rocha’s employment because o f his alleged substance abuse 
in 1990 and 1991. Rocha’s argument that CCNCS must have known in 2010 that he was a former 
substance abuser simply because he disclosed a 1991 drug conviction is too tenuous to create a 
genuine issue o f material fact. See Gecewicz. 683 F.3d at 322-23; Davis. 263 F.3d at 99-100; 
Pemice. 237 F.3d at 786-87; Jones. 192 F.3d at 429; Ennis v. N at’l Ass’n o f Bus. & Ednc. Radio, 
Inc.. 53 F.3d 55,62 (4th Cir. 1995); Harris. 2012 WL 1080990, at *5. Indeed, even Rocha admits 
that not every person convicted o f illegally possessing drugs is a drug addict. See Rocha Dep. 143.
Alternatively, even if  Rocha did establish a prima facie case, CCNCS would then need to 
provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Rocha’s employment. An 
employer’s burden o f providing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is one o f production, not 
persuasion. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993); see Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods.. Inc.. 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). An employer must present its legitimate, non­
discriminatory reason “with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity 
to demonstrate pretext.” Tex. Dep’tofC m tv. Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248.255-56 f!98Ul. For 
example, an employer’s honest belief that another candidate is better qualified due to that employee’s 
job performance and experience is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for choosing to hire one 
candidate over another candidate. Evans. 80 F.3d at 960. Likewise, an employer’s honest belief that 
an applicant made a material misrepresentation on his employment application is a legitimate, non­
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discriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action. See, e.g.. Luster v. 111. Dep’t of 
Corr., 652 F.3d 726,732 (7th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Cmtv. College. 495 F.3d 906, 
918 (8th Cir. 2007); Carter v. Tennant Co.. 383 F.3d 673,678 (7th Cir. 2004); Conner v. Schnuck 
Mkts^Jnc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997); Dwver v. Smith. 867 F.2d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 
1989).
CCNCS contends that it terminated Rocha’s employment because Dr. Gilbert believed that 
Rocha made a material misrepresentation about his criminal history in his employment application. 
This reason constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging Rocha. Accordingly, 
CCNCS has met its burden o f production and the burden shifts back to Rocha to show that there is 
a genuine issue o f material fact about whether CCNCS’s justification is pretextual.
A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by showing that the alleged non-discriminatory 
“explanation is unworthy o f credence or by offering other forms o f circumstantial evidence 
sufficiently probative o f [disability] discrimination.” Mereish v. Walker. 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). In conducting this analysis, the court does not sit to decide whether 
the employer in fact discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis o f disability. See, e.g.. Holland 
v. Washington Homes. Inc.. 487 F.3d 208,217 (4th Cir. 2007); Hawkins v. PepsiCo. Inc.. 203 F.3d 
274, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2000). Rather, the issue is whether plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to pretext under Reeves and its Fourth Circuit progeny.
Here, Rocha presents no admissible evidence suggesting that CCNCS’s stated reason for 
discharging him was pretextual. For example, he concedes that he has no evidence that CCNCS ever 
failed to terminate an employee who misrepresented his criminal history on his employment 
application. See Rocha Dep. 122. Likewise, CCNCS has consistently given the same reason to 
explain Rocha’s discharge. Nonetheless, Rocha argues that he made a “clerical error” in failing to
13
disclose his three felony convictions for possessing drugs on his employment application and that 
Dr. Gilbert did not give him time to explain himself once he admitted to one o f his felony 
convictions. See id. 101-07.
Rocha’s state o f mind is irrelevant. The focus is on whether the employer’s decisionmaker 
honestly believed that Rocha violated the employer’s employment policies and that the violation 
warranted termination. See, e ^ ., DeJamette v. Coming Tnc . 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998). 
Moreover, this court does not sit as a super-personnel board to decide whether CCNCS should have 
excused Rocha’s material misrepresentation. See id. Here, no rational jury could find that CCNCS 
(through Dr. Gilbert) was being dishonest when she explained that CCNCS terminated Rocha’s 
employment for material misrepresentation on his employment application and that the alleged 
dishonesty was designed to mask disability discrimination. Thus, the court grants summary 
judgment to CCNCS on Rocha’s ADA claim.
B.
As for Rocha’s Title VII claim, Rocha does not allege that CCNCS intentionally 
discriminated against him based on his national origin. Rather, he proceeds under a disparate impact 
theory. Specifically, Rocha alleges that CCNCS refused to employ anyone with a criminal 
conviction and that this alleged policy disparately impacts Hispanics and thereby violates Title VII. 
See [D.E. 32] 1 9; Rocha Dep. 118,123.
In order to state a disparate impact claim under Title VII, Rocha first must identify “a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis o f . . . national 
origin . . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i). Rocha contends that the “particular employment 
practice” is a policy o f refusing to employ anyone with a criminal conviction. Dr. Gilbert, however, 
stated in her affidavit that “CCNCS does not exclude all individuals with a criminal history from
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employment” and “employs at least one individual with a known criminal conviction.” Gilbert Aff. 
Uf 28-29. Moreover, Rocha has presented no admissible evidence (direct, expert, or statistical) that 
CCNCS used the alleged “particular employment practice” o f not employing any person with a 
criminal conviction. In fact, he concedes that no one at CCNCS ever told him that CCNCS used 
such a policy and that he has no evidence o f such a policy. See Rocha Dep. 152-53. Because the 
evidence shows that CCNCS did not use the alleged “particular employment practice,” Rocha’s 
disparate impact claim fails. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i); Lewis v. City o f Chicago. 130 
S. Ct. 2191,2197 (2010); Ricci v. DeStafano. 557 U.S. 557,578 (2009); Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,657 (1989), abrogated on other grounds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Mills v. 
N.C. Dep’t  o f Transp- 283 F. App’x 169, 169-70 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished); 
Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.. 406 F.3d 248, 265 (4th Cir. 2005); McNaim v. 
Sullivan. 929 F.2d 974,979 (4th Cir. 1991); Walls v. City o f Petersburg. 895 F.2d 188,191 (4th Cir. 
1990); see also Holder v. City o f  Raleigh. 867 F.2d 823, 826 (4th Cir 1989); Wright v. N at’l 
Archives & Records Serv.. 609 F.2d 702,711-13 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Accordingly, the court 
grants summary judgment to CCNCS on Rocha’s Title VII claim.
m.
In sum, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment [D.E. 113]. The court 
DENIES the other motions [D.E. 89 ,93 ,96 ,98 ,100,108,117,123,125,130,132,137]. The clerk 
shall close the case.
SO ORDERED. This Up day o f October 2013.
JAMlfS C. DEVER m  
Chief United States District Judge
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